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"ILLINOIS" LAND TRUSTS IN INDIANA
INTRODUCTION
An "Illinois" land trust is the product of two instruments, a trust
agreement and a deed in trust.' Having found a willing vendor, the
settlor2 executes a trust agreement, reserving in his power as a bene-
ficiary, the right to possess, manage and control the property constituting
the corpus of the trust.' The settlor delivers the purchase price directly
to the vendor or to the trustee' for subsequent transfer. The vendor
then executes a deed in trust which vests both legal and equitable title
in the trustee granting him all the rights, privileges and powers of
record ownership.
While the deed in trust gives the trustee broad powers, the trust
agreement limits them by defining the trustee's duties and enumerating
the rights and powers of the beneficiary. As a result, the trustee's duties
are limited to acts concerning the title and sale of the land remaining in
the trust at the end of twenty years. The beneficiary, whose interest in
the trust is clearly personal property,' nevertheless has the right to
possess the property, the power to direct its sale and the right to the
1. See Appendix A for examples of the instruments used in establishing a land
trust.
2. The land trust usually has multiple settlors and beneficiaries.
3. The pertinent provisions of the typical land trust are:
1) The trustee shall have full power and authority to sell or contract to
sell, on any terms, with or without consideration, and to mortgage, pledge
or otherwise encumber the trust property.
2) No party dealing with the trustee in any manner whatsoever shall be
obliged to inquire into the authority, necessity or expediency of any act of the
trustee, and every deed, mortgage, lease or other instrument executed by the
trustee shall be conclusive evidence in favor of every person claiming any right,
title or interest thereunder.
3) The beneficiary shall have: a) the right to direct the trustee to
convey or otherwise deal with the title to the trust property; b) the right to
possess, manage and control said property; and c) the right to receive the
proceeds and avails from the sale, rental, mortgage or other disposition of
said property.
4) The rights of the beneficiary shall be deemed to be personal property
and no beneficiary shall have any legal or equitable right, title or interest-as
realty-in or to any real estate held in the trust.
5) The duties of the trustee shall be: a) to execute instruments dealing
with the title-when, and as directed by the beneficiary and b) to sell the
trust property and distribute the proceeds if any shall remain in the trust at
the end of the twenty years.
See Appendix A.
4. The trustee of a land trust is usually a large bank. Due to the powers of sale
reposed in the trustee, its financial strength is the beneficiary's only protection.
5. See Appendix A.
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rents, profits and proceeds from the sale, mortgage or other disposition
of the property.
The land trust, an outgrowth of the Massachusetts business trust,'
has been used in Illinois for more than eighty years and has enjoyed the
recognition and encouragement of that state's courts.7 In the last ten
years, the land trust has become known and increasingly used in other
states, and has been specifically authorized by statute in Virginia'
and Florida.' Examples of this type of trust are also found in California,
Colorado and Minnesota; but in these states there appears to be no
case law supporting them."0 Likewise, the land trust is found in Indiana,
but to date has received no official recognition.1'
Although used primarily in the larger Indiana cities which border
Illinois, this device has sparked interest throughout the state.1 2 The land
trust is used extensively in Lake County where over a thousand are
currently in use.'" Although many large banks make use of this device,
they are unsure of its validity in Indiana. These banks presume that the
Indiana courts will take note of its widespread use in both Illinois and
Indiana and look favorably upon it.'4 Some conflicts have arisen con-
cerning land trusts in Indiana, but no cases have proceeded to the higher
courts. 5
The purpose of this note is to briefly review some of the many
facets of the land trust as typically used in Indiana and to analyze the
Indiana case law in relation to a determination of its validity.
PRACTICAL USES OF THE LAND TRUST 6
Normally where there is multiple ownership of land, the signature
of each owner and spouse must be obtained before a purchaser receives
title. Dealings become more difficult if some of the owners are non-
6. In business trusts, investors agree to the creation of a group of governing
trustees, vest title of property in them and grant them control of the trust business. A
beneficiary's interest is evidenced by transferable trust certificates. See Annot., 156
A.L.R. 23 (1942). Indiana has specifically rejected the Massachusetts business trust
when used for mercantile purposes. McClaren v. Dawes, 86 Ind. App. 196, 156 N.E.
584 (1927).
7. Chicago Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Cacciatore, 25 Ill. 2d 538, 185 N.E.2d 670
(1962).
8. VA. CoDE ANN. § 55-17.1 (Supp. 1966).
9. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689-.071 (Supp. 1969).
10. W. Garrett, Recent Developments in Illinois Land Trust Law, 10 DEPAuL
L. REv. 467 (1961).
11. See note 17 infra and accompanying text.
12. Interview with Walter Fischer, President of the Lake County Title and Trust
Company, in Crown Point, Indiana, October 15, 1968.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Appendix A.
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residents, and become even more complex if any of the owners die,
become incompetent, go bankrupt or become liable on a judgment. If
the property is held in a land trust, the title is immune from such chaos
since both legal and equitable ownership is vested solely in the trustee,
and the beneficiary's interest is limited to the proceeds flowing from the
property.
Since the beneficiary's interest is personal property, it is also possible
to avoid the double expense and delay of probating an estate in several
states.
The typical land trust agreement specifically provides that the
beneficiary of the trust is to remain anonymous and that the trust agree-
ment is not to be recorded.17 This privacy of ownership may be advantage-
ous when a person desires to purchase a large tract of land consisting of
separate parcels since negotiations for purchase can often be handled more
economically if the identity of the real purchaser is not known. Anonym-
ity also allows a land owner to remain aloof from negotiations with
tenants. The land trust has been criticized because this facet has allowed
slumlords to anonymously use the property for antisocial purposes. In
response to such criticism, Illinois"8 has passed legislation which requires
the disclosure of the names of the beneficiaries of any trust when there
exists on the property involved some violation of a building code or
municipal ordinance. It is interesting to note that the Indiana legislature
in 1967 passed similar legislation. 9 This may denote a tacit recognition
of the land trust by the legislature.
Where it is agreeable to the lender, liability on standard mortgages
may be limited to the land itself and the personal liability of the land-
owner is not needed. Likewise, under a land trust, the trustee, at the
direction of the beneficiary, may execute both the note and the mortgage
with a clause exculpating himself and the beneficiary. The interest of
the beneficiary in the income produced by the property may also be
pledged as security for a personal loan."0
VALIDATION IN INDIANA
The validity and number of legal advantages which may be gained
from the land trust in Indiana depend upon the answers to the following
questions: 1) Can the land trust be held valid as a resulting trust? 2)
Are the duties placed upon the trustee sufficient to withstand an attack
17. See generally W. GARRErT, LAND TRUSTS 7-9 (1966).
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 61 (1965).
19. IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-616 (Supp. 1968).
20. The enumeration here is brief. Further explanation may be found in W.
GARRETT, LAND TRUSTS (1966); and 0. CAPLAN, THE LAW OF LAND TRUSTS (3d ed.
1960).
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under the Indiana statute of uses ?21 3) Is the interest of the beneficiary
personal property? The first two deal with the validity of the trust itself,
the latter with the number of advantages which may be gained by its use.
As a Resulting Trust
In the formation of a land trust, the creator furnishes the purchase
price and the property is deeded to another. As a result of this procedure,
the transaction comes within the purview of Indiana statutes dealing with
resulting trusts. The relevant sections are 56-6062 and 56-608."3 Section
56-606 extinguished a preexisting presumption that a party who fur-
nishes the purchase money for land, taken in the name of another,
intended to acquire title for himself.24 Section 56-608 enumerates excep-
tions to section 56-606.
To establish a resulting trust, it is necessary that the deed to the
second person be absolute on its face.2" This is not the case in the
standard land trust situation where the land is conveyed under a deed in
trust. If the property in a land trust is conveyed under a deed appearing
absolute on its face, it is possible to uphold the land trust as a resulting
trust. Due to the fact that the beneficiary is not named in the con-
veyance, the trust could not be executed by the Indiana statute of uses.2"
But, as a resulting trust, there is some doubt as to whether the trust
agreement would have any effect.27 Also, the beneficiary's interest would
21. IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-609 (1961).
22. When a conveyance for valuable consideration is made to one person, and
the consideration therefore paid by another, no use or trust shall result in favor
of the latter; but shall vest in the former, subject to the provisions of the next
two (2) sections.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-606 (1961).
23. The provisions of § 56-606 shall not extend to cases where the alienee
shall have tak.. an absolute conveyance in his own name, without the consent
of the person with whose money the consideration was paid; or where such
alienee, in violation of some trust, shall have purchased the lands with
monies not his own; or where it shall be made to appear that, by agreement,
and without any fraudulent intent, the party to whom the title shall vest, was
to hold the land or some interest therein in trust for the party paying the
purchase-money or some part thereof.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-608 (1961) (emphasis added).
24. Koehler v. Koehler, 75 Ind. App. 510, 121 N.E. 450 (1920); Makeever v.
Yeoman, 69 Ind. App. 324, 121 N.E. 672 (1918).
25. [T]he words "absolute conveyance" refer not to the taking of a fee simple
absolute, but to the taking of a conveyance absolute in the benefit of the alienee.
McClellan v. Beatty, 115 Ind. App. 173, 179, 53 N.E.2d 1013, 1016 (1944).
26. See Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 179 Ind. 78, 98 N.E. 37 (1912), modified on
other grounds and rehearing denied, 179 Ind. 78, 100 N.E. 376 (1912) ; Gaylord v.
Dodge, 31 Ind. 41 (1869).
27. As we have seen, where a testator devises real property in trust and
directs that the property be sold and the proceeds held in trust or distributed,
the interest of the beneficiaries, being a right to receive money rather than
to receive land, is treated as personal property. In such a case there is said to
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1969], Art. 9
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probably be deemed an equitable estate or interst in the land itself.
Such a determination would destroy many of the advantages gained by
the land trust.
As an Active Trust in Realty
Indiana Annotated Statutes, section 56-609,"8 is the Indiana version
of the Statute of Uses. By virtue of this statute, a dry, naked or passive
trust is executed, vesting legal title in the beneficiary."9 The statute
does not operate when active duties are placed on the trustee"0 or where
the beneficiary is not named in the deed."' To preclude the execution of
the trust, the statute states that the trustee must have active duties; but
it fails to define what duties would be considered sufficient. Thus, a
review and analysis of the Indiana cases dealing with this point becomes
necessary.
The provisions of a land trust relevant to a discussion of the
Statute of Uses are as follows: 1) the trustee shall have the duty to sell
the trust property when directed to do so by the beneficiary; and 2) the
trustee shall sell all the property remaining in the trust at the end of
twenty years and shall divide the proceeds among the beneficiaries."
Where No Duties Are Enumerated
Where property is devised to a person in trust and the conveyance
fails to enumerate any duties in the trustee, the trust will be executed and
title will vest in the beneficiary. Dealing with such a situation, the court in
Allen v. Craft8" said:
The designation of John Allen as trustee is ineffective, inas-
be an equitable conversion of the property devised. If the intended trust fails,
however, the property reverts to the heirs or residuary legatee. The reason for
converting the real estate into personalty ceases with the failure of the trust.
The conversion was to be effectuated only for the purposes of the trust. If
the trust fails, there is no duty to convert. Accordingly, the interest results
as realty and not as personalty.
5 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 411.3 (2d ed. 1967).
28. A conveyance or devise of lands to a trustee whose title is nominal only,
and who has no power of disposition or management of such lands, is void
as to the trustee, and shall be deemed a direct conveyance or devise to the
beneficiary.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-609 (1961).
29. Nelson v. Davis, 35 Ind. 474 (1871); see Gaylord v. Dodge, 31 Ind. 41
(1869). Under a passive or dry trust, the whole legal and equitable estate is merged
and is immediately vested in the beneficiary. Allen v. Craft, 109 Ind. 476, 9 N.E. 919
(1887),
30. Nelson v. Davis, 35 Ind. 474 (1871).
31. Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 179 Ind. 78, 98 N.E. 37 (1912) ; Gaylord v. Dodge,
31 Ind. 41 (1869).
32. See Appendix A.
33. 109 Ind. 476, 9 N.E. 919 (1887).
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much as no power of control or disposition is vested in him.
The estate, whatever its character, devised to Matilda Allen
vests directly in her. This is the effect of the statute, as the
trust is a mere naked one."
Agreement to Reconvey-The Straw Man
Where the sole purpose of the trust is to vest legal title in the
trustee with direction to pass it to specified beneficiaries, without any
discretion concerning the type of conveyance or shares of the con-
veyees,"5 Indiana cases have held that a mere nominal title is vested in
the trustee." In Myers v. Jackson,7 Myers and his wife joined in
conveying a one-third interest of certain lands to a trustee who took title
for the sole purpose of reconveying it to the wife. The court held that the
facts presented a naked or nominal trust. The court stated that since the
trustee had no right of possession or control, except to reconvey, the
statute executed the trust.
Although overruled in part by Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser,"s which
required that the beneficiary be named in the conveyance before the
statute would operate, Myers is still valid in determining whether a
duty to reconvey is sufficient."9
Power to Sell and Convey
It is obvious that in the above cases the beneficiaries were certain
and that the transfer of title involved a mere mechanical act. The trustees
were no more than agents to deliver title and were not vested with the
ownership for the use of another. While authorities state that such
trusts are passive,4" they consider a trust active when there is uncer-
tainty as to the conveyees, discretion in the trustee to determine the
eventual beneficiaries or where the trustee has the power to sell the
property. 1
34. Id. at 478, 9 N.E. at 920.
35. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 206 (2d ed. 1964).
36. Roberts v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 135 Ind. 154, 36 N.E. 128 (1894);
Myers v. Jackson, 135 Ind. 136, 34 N.E. 810 (1893).
37. 135 Ind. 136, 34 N.E. 810 (1893).
38. 179 Ind. 78, 98 N.E. 37 (1912).
39. In Myers and Roberts, the name of the beneficiary was not mentioned in the
conveyance and therefore the trusts should not have been held to be executed by the
Statutes of Uses.
40. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 209 (2d ed. 1964); 1 A. Scorr, TRUSTS §
69.1 (2d ed. 1967).
41. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 209 (2d ed. 1964). Bogert resolves the
question of whether a duty to convey is active in the answers to two questions: Are
the conveyees fixed and certain, or are they contingent and unidentified? Is the act of
preparing, executing and delivering a deed a formal and mechanical act which involves
no substantial amount of discretion, or does it require affirmative acts of considerable
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Bogert states that when the sole duty of the trustees is to place a
beneficiary in the possession and control of property, the trust is clearly
passive.42 He further states that if the trustee is to have a power of sale
over the property, the trust is deemed active.4"
Concerning situations in which there is a life beneficiary and
another is to take at the death of the former, Scott states:
Where the trustee is directed to pay over the rents and profits
to one beneficiary for life and subject thereto to hold the
property in trust for another beneficiary, the latter beneficiary
immediately has a legal estate in remainder and the trustee
holds only an estate for the life of the former beneficiary.44
Scott, however, goes on to indicate that where the trustee, upon
the death of the life tenant, is to sell the land and divide the proceeds,
the trustee holds the remainder interest upon an active trust.4" Both
authors recognize the distinction between merely conveying directly to
specified beneficiaries and the duty or power of the trustee to sell the
trust corpus. In the examples cited by Bogert and Scott, the power of
sale in the trustee was the determining factor which made the trusts active.
The Restatement of Trusts46 adopts the position that a duty on the
part of the trustee to convey at the direction of the beneficiary makes a
trust active. Indiana cases directly support this proposition.
Thus, where a trust agreement required the trustee, upon advice
importance? Id. While Scott makes the rather broad statement that "by the weight of
authority it has been held that the direction to convey is sufficient to make a trust
active," a review of his discussion in this area evidences a recognition and agreement
with Bogert. 1 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 69.1 (2d ed. 1967).
42. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 208 (2d ed. 1964).
43. Id.
44. 1 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 69.2 (2d ed. 1967).
45. Id. at 662-63.
46. Prior to the enactment of the Statute of Uses a person who held land to
the use of another had, in addition to his negative duties, the following two
affirmative duties: (1) to protect the property against other persons than the
beneficiary; (2) to convey the property to the beneficiary or in accordance
with his directions. If there was a manifestation of an intention to impose
additional affirmative duties, he held upon an active trust.
After the enactment of the Statute of Uses if the Statute vests the legal
title in the beneficiary it is no longer necessary to impose upon the trustee
affirmative duties, since the beneficiary having the legal title can protect the
property himself and since no conveyance to him is necessary. If a passive trust
is not executed by the Statute of Uses, as in the case of a trust of a leasehold
interest or a use, the trustee is under a duty to protect the property and convey
it to the beneficiary or in accordance with his directions. If, however, after
the enactment of the Statute of Uses either or both of these duties is by the
terms of the trust specifically imposed upon the trustee, the trust is not
executed by the Statute of Uses.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 69 (1959).
47. McCleary v. Chipman, 32 Ind. App. 489, 68 N.E. 320 (1903).
et al.: "Illinois" Land Trusts in Indiana
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and consent of the beneficiary, to sell the corpus of the trust and reinvest
the proceeds, it was held that a duty was imposed upon the trustee
which he could not discharge without retaining the legal title; and that
in such a case, the statute never executed the trust.4 The fact that the
trustees could not sell without the consent of the beneficiaries did not
destroy their power of distribution:
Whenever any agency, duty or power is imposed upon the
trustee in relation to the land conveyed the trust is said to be
an active one .... There was a limitation on the trustee's power,
but notwithstanding such limitation, a power of disposition was
given.49
In an earlier case,"0 where lots were conveyed to a trustee who was
then under a duty to convey the lots to various parties after they had
paid one-half the purchase price of land under a subscription contract,
he was held not to be a mere nominal trustee. The power vested in him
to convey to subscribers made the trust active.
It has also been held that the power or duty to sell need not be
mandatory but may lie in the discretion of the trustee. In Crist v.
Schank,5 ' a testator devised land to his wife under instructions that if a
named person married and had issue, the wife might convey to such
"issue or children." The court held that the trust was active and that the
interest of the "issue or children," if any, was totally dependent upon the
actions of the wife.
From the foregoing discussion, it appears that the duty of the
trustee under a land trust to convey the trust corpus at the direction of
the beneficiary is sufficient to make the trust active within the meaning
of the Indiana version of the Statute of Uses. The fact that the trustee
also has the duty to sell the corpus of the trust at the end of twenty
years reinforces this conclusion. In neither case can the trustee effectuate
the purpose of the trust without retention of the fee and in neither case
is his title only nominal.
BENEFICIARY'S INTEREST AS PERSONAL PROPERTY
The most salient feature of the land trust is that by application of
the doctrine of equitable conversion, the interest of the beneficiary is
converted from a legal interest or equitable title in real estate to a
beneficial interest in the rents, profits and avails of the land. This
48. McCoy v. Monte, 90 Ind. 441 (1883).
49. Id. at 444-45.
50. McCleary v. Chipman, 32 Ind. App. 489, 68 N.E. 320 (1903).
51. 146 Ind. 277, 45 N.E. 190 (1896).
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beneficial interest, as declared in the deed of trust, is considered for all
purposes to be personal property."
Scott"8 and the Restatement' take the position that the mandatory
direction to the trustee to sell causes the equitable conversion. However,
there is some question as to when the equitable conversion takes place:
at the date the instrument becomes effective or at the time of the actual
conversion.
In Indiana, the bulk of cases"5 concerned with equitable conversion
deal with testamentary trusts. The typical situation arises when a testator
provides for a life estate in trust in one person and directs that at the
death of the life beneficiary, the land shall be sold and the proceeds
distributed to the remainderman. This is analogous to an inter vivos land
trust in which the settlor creates the trust, with the reservation of the
right to possess, manage and control the property, and directs that at the
end of twenty years, the property remaining in the trust shall be sold and
the proceeds divided among the beneficiaries or those designated to
receive such proceeds. For convenience," the Indiana cases dealing with
equitable conversion may be classified as follows: 1) those involving a
declaration that the beneficiary's interest was personal property; 2) those
in which the trustee was given the power to sell the property; and 3)
those where the trustee was explicitly directed to sell the land.
Declaration
In Comer v. Light,57 the court stated that a testator could not
change realty into personalty, or vice versa, by a mere declaration that it
shall be one or the other.5" Although the court decided a point not
actually before it,59 this case appears conclusive on the point that a mere
declaration in the land trust would not be sufficient to bring the doctrine
52. See Appendix A.
53. 2 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 131 (2d ed. 1967).
54. RESTATEMENT (SE OND) OF TRUSTS § 131 (1959).
55. Lantz v. Caraway, 180 Ind. 484, 103 N.E. 335 (1913); Comer v. Light, 175
Ind. 367, 93 N.E. 660 (1911) ; Rumsey v. Durham, 5 Ind. 71 (1854); Walling v. Scott,
50 Ind. App. 23, 96 N.E. 481 (1912) ; Nelson v. Nelson, 36 Ind. App. 331, 75 N.E. 679
(1905).
56. The provisions of a typical land trust relevant to the discussion here are: 1)
the express declaration that the beneficiary's interest in the trust is for all purposes to
be considered personal property; 2) the trustee is to deal with and convey title at the
direction of the beneficiary; and 3) the explicit direction to sell the property remaining
in the trust at the end of twenty years.
57. 175 Ind. 367, 93 N.E. 660 (1911); see Lantz v. Caraway, 180 Ind. 484, 103
N.E. 335 (1913).
58. Quoting from the early New York case, Matter of Hunter, 3 Redf. Sur.
(N.Y.) 176 (c. 1874).
59. The testamentary trust involved in Comer did not specifically declare that the
beneficiary's interest was to be considered personal property.
et al.: "Illinois" Land Trusts in Indiana
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into play and would only be evidence of the intent of the settlor."0
Power of Sale
In Porter v. Union Trust,"' a testator devised the residue of his
estate to a trustee, giving him full and absolute discretionary power to
sell all the property and reinvest the proceeds. The court held that the
power of sale alone did not bring the doctrine of equitable conversion
into play on the date that the instrument became operative, but that the
subsequent exercise of the power would effectuate the conversion. Dill-
man v. Fulwinder2 dealt with similar facts. There, the court specifically
held that a provision authorizing the sale was not of itself sufficient to
convert the estate in lands to one in personal property: "To work such an
equitable conversion, such a provision must by its terms expressly or
impliedly require rather than authorize such a sale." 3
From these decisions it may be deduced that when the exercise of
the power of sale is predicated upon a contingency, the operation of the
doctrine is precluded until the contingency occurs." Equitable con-
version is not a fixed rule of law but proceeds upon equitable principles
and "is interposed for the purpose of carrying out the intention of the
testator so far as that can be done within the rules of law.""3 Intent is
controlling and unless it is clear that the settlor intended an absolute
conversion as evidenced by an explicit direction to sell, the immediate
operation of the doctrine cannot be sustained.
Explicit Direction to Sell
One of the earliest cases dealing with an explicit direction to sell
was Rumsey v. Durham.66 In that case, the testator's will created a life
estate in his widow. In the event of her death or marriage, the executors,
under an express power, were to sell all his property and divide the
proceeds among his children. The court held that the direction to sell
was, in effect, a conversion of the land into personalty."7 In considering
the question of when the property vested in the children, the court said,
"To us it is clear that the actual intention of the testator was that the
60. "The doctrine of equitable conversion is a legal fiction invented to protect the
beneficiaries and to sustain and carry out the intention of a testator or settlor, never to
defeat it." Duckwall v. Lease, 106 Ind. App. 664, 678, 20 N.E. 204, 210 (1939) (emphasis
added).
61. 182 Ind. 637, 108 N.E. 117 (1915).
62. 57 Ind. App. 632, 105 N.E. 124 (1914).
63. Id. at 641, 105 N.E. at 127 (emphasis added).
64. Lantz v. Caraway, 180 Ind. 484, 103 N.E. 335 (1913).
65. Comer v. Light, 175 Ind. 367, 373, 93 N.E. 660, 662 (1911).
66. 5 Ind. 71 (1854).
67. Id. at 73-74.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1969], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol3/iss2/9
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
right to the distributive shares donated by the will should vest in his
children immediately on his decease."68 The court went on to say that
the distribution under the will should be treated as if the donation had,
in the first instance, been money.69
In a subsequent decision"0 concerning similar facts and issues, the
Indiana appellate court indicated that when a testator had made it
obligatory upon his executor, at the death of a life tenant, to convert all
his property then remaining into money, "the weight of authority
seem[s] to be that an equitable conversion of the testator's real estate
took place at the time of his death, and such conversion will not be post-
poned by the fact that the land is not to be sold until after the death of the
life tenant."71 Furthermore, the court said, "[T]he land must be con-
sidered as money, because there is nothing indicating the intention to give
his children anything but money."72
In a land trust situation there is a twenty year period which is analog-
ous to the life estate mentioned in the above cases. During this period the
trustee has a power of sale but may exercise it only upon direction of the
beneficiary. Were this the only provision, an equitable conversion would
not take place until the power was exercised.73 The land trust, however,
also provides that the trustee shall sell all property remaining in the trust
at the end of the twenty year period. It is this feature of the trust which
brings the doctrine into play on the date the instrument becomes opera-
tive.7
Life v. Stricler5 is a case in which the agreement was closely
analogous to a land trust. The testator had devised all his real estate
directly to his executor with full power to sell the same without inter-
vention of a court and without the signature of any of the heirs. The
testator specifically intended to grant to the executor "full power to
transfer and convey" all the real estate he might own at his death, free
and unencumbered by any interests of his children or his widow. The
appellate court, in affirming the lower court's determination that there
was no interest in the land passing to the heirs, said:
It thus appears that the real estate, the rents and profits of which
68 Id.
69. Id.
70. Nelson v. Nelson, 36 Ind. App. 331, 75 N.E. 679 (1905).
71. Id. at 336, 75 N.E. at 681.
72. Id.
73. Porter v. Union Trust, 182 Ind. 637, 108 N.E. 117 (1915) ; Lantz v. Caraway,
180 Ind. 484, 103 N.E. 335 (1913); Dillman v. Fulwinder, 57 Ind. App. 632, 105 N.E.
124 (1914).
74. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
75. 87 Ind. App. 281, 156 N.E. 575 (1927).
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are here involved, was devised to the executor with power to sell
and dispose of the same, and there was not a devise simpiy
directing that the real estate be sold and the proceeds distributed."'
The court further stated, "The whole estate having been devised to
appellee as executor, it is clear that there was no interest passing to the
heirs." 7
In both the Life case situation and in a typical land trust, there is an
explicit direction to sell which, under Indiana case law, would cause an
equitable conversion of the interest of the beneficiary at the time the
instrument became operative. Both also contain an express devise of the
real estate to the trustee which vests in him both legal and equitable title
to the land.
CONCLUSION
Experience has shown that the land trust performs many commer-
cially useful functions: it obviates the cumbersome nature of real estate
transactions where there are multiple owners; it simplifies the manage-
ment and financing of real properties; and it is especially useful in the
financing and marketing of subdivisions, large scale home enterprises and
apartment building complexes. Delays and legal complexities resulting
from the death, incompetency or disappearance of an owner of a fractional
interest in land may be eliminated by the careful use of a land trust.
In Illinois, the land trust has served an important function in regard
to titles to real estate, and millions of dollars have been invested on the sole
security of the land trust. Indiana has recognized the usefulness of the
land trust and is following the lead taken by Illinois.
While a trustee's duties under a land trust are admittedly sparse,
they are sufficient under Indiana law to withstand an attack based on
the Indiana statute of uses. The duties of the trustee to sell at the direc-
tion of the beneficiary, and to sell all property remaining in the trust at
the end of twenty years are clearly active duties. It is also clear that the
express conveyance of the property and the explicit direction to sell are
sufficient to create an equitable conversion of the beneficiary's interest
in the trust at the time the trust becomes operative.
76. Id. at 286, 156 N.E. at 577.
77. Id.
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